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AbsTrACT
The introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing 
(NIPT) in healthcare systems around the world offers 
an opportunity to reconsider funding policies for 
prenatal screening. In some countries with universal 
access healthcare systems, pregnant women and their 
partners are asked to (co)pay for NIPT. In this paper, we 
discuss two important rationales for charging women 
for NIPT: (1) to prevent increased uptake of NIPT and 
(2) to promote informed choice. First, given the aim 
of prenatal screening (reproductive autonomy), high 
or low uptake rates are not intrinsically desirable or 
undesirable. Using funding policies to negatively affect 
uptake, however, is at odds with the aim of screening. 
Furthermore, copayment disproportionally affects 
those of lower socioeconomic status, which conflicts 
with justice requirements and impedes equal access 
to prenatal screening. Second, we argue that although 
payment models may influence pregnant women’s choice 
behaviours and perceptions of the relevance of NIPT, 
the copayment requirement does not necessarily lead 
to better-informed choices. On the contrary, external (ie, 
financial) influences on women’s personal choices for or 
against prenatal screening should ideally be avoided. To 
improve informed decision-making, healthcare systems 
should instead invest in adequate non-directive, value-
focused pretest counselling. This paper concludes that 
requiring (substantial) copayments for NIPT in universal 
access healthcare systems fails to promote reproductive 
autonomy and is unfair. 
InTrOduCTIOn
A new first-trimester prenatal screening test 
commonly referred to as non-invasive prenatal 
testing (NIPT) is in the process of being imple-
mented in countries around the world. With NIPT, 
chromosomal abnormalities can be detected in 
cell-free DNA circulating in maternal blood, giving 
pregnant women the opportunity to consider 
reproductive options—either prepare for the birth 
of a child with a disability or terminate the preg-
nancy. In some countries, including the UK, France, 
Canada and the Netherlands, NIPT is available in 
implementation research settings.1 2 In the USA, 
Israel and Australia, NIPT is available primarily 
through commercial providers.3 In other countries, 
such as Belgium, Denmark and Singapore, it is either 
already part of routine antenatal care4 or offered 
through publicly funded screening programmes.5 
NIPT is procedurally safe and simple, and its test 
performance for trisomy 21 (Down syndrome), 
trisomy 18 (Edwards syndrome) and trisomy 13 
(Patau syndrome) is better than that of the conven-
tional combined test based on nuchal translucency 
ultrasound, blood tests and maternal age. Even in 
low-risk pregnancies, NIPT is characterised by 
high sensitivity and specificity.6 It requires only 
a blood draw from the pregnant woman at 9–11 
weeks of gestation. NIPT is not a diagnostic test; 
as cell-free DNA is derived not from the fetus 
but from the placenta, an abnormal NIPT result 
requires confirmation through invasive follow-up 
diagnostic testing (ie, chorionic villus sampling or 
amniocentesis). Because of its better test perfor-
mance for trisomies 21, 18 and 13, however, NIPT 
requires fewer invasive follow-up tests than does 
the combined test, and thus leads to fewer iatro-
genic miscarriages.
First-trimester prenatal screening has tradition-
ally been offered free of charge in many countries. 
A survey conducted in 2015 across 28 countries 
around the world shows that conventional first-tri-
mester screening was generally covered in full or in 
part by public health programmes, with the excep-
tion of Argentina, Ireland, India, the Netherlands, 
Mexico, Qatar and the USA.4 Funding policies for 
screening are likely to affect its uptake; in coun-
tries where first-trimester prenatal screening is fully 
publicly funded, the uptake is usually high, such as 
in Denmark (90%) and Belgium (80%),7 whereas in 
countries like the Netherlands, where women paid 
out of pocket for the combined test, the uptake has 
traditionally been lower, at around 30%.8 In the US, 
NIPT costs approximately US$400,9 and insurance 
coverage for NIPT is variable.3 In a recent study, 
US obstetricians indicated that the cost of NIPT is 
currently hampering its utilisation.10 Healthcare 
professionals in Canada, too, observe that financial 
cost is ‘an important barrier’ to accessing NIPT.11
The introduction of NIPT raises ethical quan-
daries. Notably, there are discussions with regard 
to the appropriate scope of NIPT.12–14 Dutch labo-
ratories are licensed to screen for trisomies 13, 
18 and 21 only, although pregnant women can 
choose to have incidental findings reported as 
well. These findings pertain mostly to other chro-
mosomal abnormalities, which may be rarer, but 
can be equally or more severe, and of sufficiently 
understood clinical significance. In some coun-
tries, the scope of NIPT has expanded to include 
sex-chromosomal abnormalities and microdeletion 
syndromes. In this paper, when we write about 
NIPT, we consider the use of NIPT primarily as a 
first-tier (‘universal’) or second-tier (‘contingent’) 
screening test for trisomies 13, 18 and 21. The 
argument may be extended to other chromosomal 
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abnormalities that are ‘markedly severe’,15 or ‘serious congen-
ital conditions and childhood disorders’.13 We do not consider 
the use of NIPT for the detection of other medical or non-med-
ical conditions (including sex determination), for which there 
has thus far been less public support.16 Also, we proceed from 
the notion that prenatal screening programmes are acceptable, 
and that allowing women to terminate a pregnancy in case of a 
serious fetal health condition is acceptable.
The ongoing introduction of NIPT around the world requires 
a reconsideration of funding policies for first-trimester prenatal 
screening. Should pregnant women and their partners be charged 
for NIPT, and on what grounds? There are practical as well as 
principled reasons to charge women for NIPT. In resource-con-
strained settings, societies may not have sufficient funds to offer 
NIPT free of charge. Universal NIPT is both more effective than 
the first-trimester combined test in detecting trisomies and more 
costly.17 In most ‘cost-effectiveness’ studies, however, the costs 
of the care and support required for children with chromosomal 
abnormalities are not taken into account. Furthermore, although 
the costs of NIPT may currently be among the main reasons for 
states to charge women, these costs will likely decrease in the 
future as the technology develops.
This paper, therefore, focuses on principled reasons for 
charging—assuming that the practical reasons for doing so (ie, 
lack of resources, organisational challenges) need not be deci-
sive. We critically discuss two principled rationales for asking 
pregnant women and their partners to (co)pay for NIPT: to 
prevent increased uptake of screening and to improve informed 
decision-making. First, a financial contribution can function as 
a hurdle, making prenatal screening more difficult to obtain 
and discouraging women from taking part. Some of those who 
oppose widespread uptake of prenatal screening and/or abortion 
may not only wish to refrain from screening themselves, but may 
also prefer others to forgo screening. Asking a significant sum 
may help in maintaining or decreasing the number of women 
who participate in screening. A second moral justification for 
charging women is to promote informed and well-considered 
choices for or against the prenatal screening offer. Charging is 
believed to help women understand that first-trimester screening 
is not part of routine antenatal care, but something different. 
Copayment is believed to help create ‘choice awareness’ and to 
ensure well-considered participation in screening. Both ratio-
nales merit further scrutiny, as it is not self-evident that charging 
for NIPT is justifiable from a justice perspective or contributes 
to well-considered choices.
rationale 1: charging women to prevent increased uptake of 
screening
One reason for charging pregnant women for NIPT is to prevent 
an increase in uptake of prenatal screening, and thus to prevent 
an increase in the number of abortions. Although commentators 
do not usually explicitly mention this rationale, it follows from 
the reverse concern that public funding of NIPT may encourage 
women to take part in prenatal screening. If the state offers 
prenatal screening free of charge, it gives the impression that 
it condones screening as a form of routine care among other 
antenatal care services. An offer of NIPT would lead to a higher 
uptake of screening and—following this rationale—a higher 
uptake is perceived to be problematic.
With the start of the Dutch NIPT implementation study in 
April 2017, for instance, it was feared that pregnant women 
would ‘rush’ to academic medical centres to obtain NIPT.18 The 
notion that all Dutch women would engage in screening was 
seen as intrinsically undesirable. Pregnant women and mothers 
of children with Down syndrome were concerned that abortion 
rates would rise, and that Down syndrome might disappear from 
society.19–21
This is not likely. In the Netherlands, the majority of women 
decline first-trimester screening altogether, even today, now 
NIPT is widely available. Moreover, not all prenatal screening 
results in abortion. In the period 2000–2013, around 85% of 
pregnancies with a confirmed diagnosis of Down syndrome 
resulted in termination,22 which means that a substantial 
minority chose to continue the pregnancy. Certain groups in 
Dutch society hold a relatively high acceptance and positive 
image of Down syndrome; some Dutch women do not consider 
Down syndrome ‘severe enough to justify termination of preg-
nancy’.23 The number is consistent with termination rates found 
in other countries, such as the USA,24 the UK25 and other Euro-
pean countries,26 but lower than the rates reported elsewhere, 
such as 93% in Australia27 and 98% in Denmark.28 Overall, the 
prevalence of Down syndrome has been relatively stable around 
the world since the early 1990s.29 This is not likely to change 
with the introduction of NIPT, as in countries like the UK and 
the Netherlands some women continue to opt for first-trimester 
prenatal screening ‘for information only’1 and refrain from abor-
tion. A recent review of studies from the USA, Asia and Europe 
suggested that termination rates following the introduction of 
NIPT were unchanged or even decreased.30
Even if Down syndrome would disappear from society, this 
may be considered a loss in terms of social diversity, but it may 
not be a soluble problem or a moral wrong as long as termina-
tions resulted from pregnant women’s autonomous decisions. A 
related—and possibly valid—concern is that if fewer children 
are born with Down syndrome, the acceptation of persons with 
Down syndrome and the quality of their medical care and support 
might decrease,20 21 and discrimination and stigmatisation of 
affected persons and families might increase. Pregnant women 
and their partners may indeed feel less free to carry an affected 
pregnancy to term if good-quality medical care and support were 
not available for disabled children. Reproductive autonomy, the 
stated aim of first-trimester prenatal screening,12 presupposes 
that disabled children receive the support they need. Therefore, 
the existence of ‘decent, fair, inclusive and supportive policies 
with regard to the abilities and conditions of all people’15 is a 
precondition for a responsible prenatal screening programme.
Charging money can be thought of as a political compromise 
to those who oppose widespread use of prenatal screening and/or 
abortion and believe that first-trimester screening may (need to) 
be available to women who actively and purposively request it, 
but should not be too readily available. (Co)payment thus serves 
as a barrier to access, aimed at discouraging women from taking 
part. However, this is not consistent with the aim of prenatal 
screening. Women should not be withheld from screening, just as 
those who oppose screening should not be put under pressure to 
take part. In Dutch counselling practices, women are presented 
with an ‘information offer’ about screening first, which they are 
free to refuse, to safeguard their ‘right not to know’. Also, the 
ethical requirement of non-directiveness in counselling is meant 
to safeguard the voluntariness of participation. Such measures 
should be in place in screening programmes around the world 
to avoid any pressure on women to participate in screening just 
because it is ‘the norm’.31
In countries where screening and/or abortion are morally 
controversial, so it is argued, it is not obvious that society should 
bear the costs of prenatal screening.32 Other healthcare priorities 
may be more important than sustaining screening programmes 
aimed at promoting reproductive ‘liberty and autonomy’.15 In 
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response, we would like to stress that prenatal screening does 
not aim at promoting unrestricted reproductive liberty and 
autonomy, but at offering information about severe health condi-
tions in the fetus that could be a reason for pregnant women to 
consider terminating the pregnancy, so as to prevent the birth 
of an affected child. Children born with trisomy 13 or 18 are 
severely ill, and most children die before birth or within days, 
weeks or months after birth. There is less consensus on Down 
syndrome as a justified reason to terminate an affected preg-
nancy; some children born with trisomy 21 may lead relatively 
contented lives, while others develop severe cognitive delays and 
somatic conditions. A life with Down syndrome, ‘even if it does 
not involve major medical problems, is fraught with intellectual 
disabilities and […] it is, in most cases, a life that is shorter than 
other human lives’.33 Some prospective parents may wish to 
prevent this in their families. Empirically, there is broad societal 
support for public funding of NIPT for trisomies. A Canadian 
study found that the majority of women (66.9%) thought that 
all pregnant women should have access to NIPT free of charge.11 
Also women in Australia (93% of respondents) have been found 
to support public funding of NIPT.34
Finally, by putting up a barrier that is higher for less affluent 
women than for more affluent women, the (co)payment require-
ment raises intractable justice concerns and hinders equity of access 
to first-trimester prenatal screening. Charging for NIPT affects 
disproportionally those who are least well off financially, which 
challenges the principle of equal access to first-trimester prenatal 
screening. The (co)payment requirement may in part explain the 
especially low uptake among groups of lower socioeconomic status 
and minority ethnic groups vis-à-vis groups of higher socioeco-
nomic status, which has been found to be unrelated to attitudes 
towards screening.35 Rather, socioeconomically disadvantaged 
women are less likely to act on their (positive) attitudes towards 
screening than socioeconomically advantaged women when 
confronted with financial and physical barriers, such as requiring 
extra visits to the midwifery clinic. Women from minority ethnic 
groups may also be less knowledgeable about Down syndrome36 
and other chromosomal abnormalities. Putting up a financial 
barrier may exacerbate these differences in uptake,37 and therewith 
it may exacerbate choice disparities among groups of higher and 
lower socioeconomic status. Offering NIPT free of charge is likely 
to reduce these disparities.
Alternatively, differentiated funding policies could be consid-
ered, in which women who can afford (co)paying for NIPT 
would be asked to do so, while those who cannot would be 
offered NIPT free of charge, or would be partly reimbursed after-
wards. Although other ways to promote equal access to prenatal 
screening can thus be imagined, practical and logistical issues are 
likely to limit the feasibility of, for instance, differentiated pricing 
schemes.
Finally, in countries such as the Netherlands, where all pregnant 
women are offered a free ultrasound scan for structural anoma-
lies at 20 weeks of gestation, charging for NIPT seems strikingly 
inconsistent. Despite morally relevant differences between the 
two screening tests (notably, although the 20-week ultrasound is 
aimed primarily at reproductive autonomy, it also aims to improve 
maternal health and pregnancy outcomes), we find it remarkable 
that NIPT tends to elicit ethical discussions, whereas the 20-week 
ultrasound does not.
In sum, funding policies should support prenatal screening 
programmes in achieving their aim of promoting reproductive 
autonomy. They should not be used to negatively affect uptake 
rates.
rationale 2: charging women to improve informed decision-
making
A second argument brought forward in public discussions 
for charging money for NIPT is that it will improve deci-
sion-making.38 A financial contribution to NIPT is thought to 
have the benefit of signalling to pregnant women and their part-
ners that screening is optional: screening is an offer that may 
have far-reaching implications that should be considered before-
hand.39 Because NIPT requires only a simple blood draw, just 
like other routine screening tests offered during the pregnancy, 
such as tests for HIV, hepatitis B, syphilis, blood type, Rhesus 
factor or antibodies, observers are concerned that women will 
thoughtlessly accept NIPT.12 Also, they may feel less justified 
in forsaking screening, as NIPT ‘removes the risk to pregnancy 
as a reason for declining testing’,40 and may experience societal 
pressure to take part in screening. Meeting the aim of repro-
ductive autonomy is generally considered to require ‘informed 
choice’ for or against a screening offer. Participation in screening 
should be the result of such adequately informed, voluntary and 
value-consistent decisions,41 not of passive acceptance or acqui-
escence to societal pressure.
It is feared that because of the non-invasive character of NIPT, 
health professionals may treat the informed choice process 
differently—less stringently—than they would in the context of 
invasive testing, requiring less time to consider or not asking 
for written informed consent.42 NIPT would be presented by 
counsellors as a routine procedure and would consequently 
be perceived as such by pregnant women and their partners, 
a concern referred to as ‘routinisation’.43 If women may not 
appreciate the significance of the test, it would ‘become more 
difficult to achieve the aim of enabling autonomous reproduc-
tive choices’.12 In sum, in the absence of accepted reasons not 
to take part in first-trimester prenatal screening, such as safety 
or financial considerations, pregnant women may consider less 
thoroughly whether or not to take part. Also, state funding is 
believed to send a ‘legitimizing’ message about the importance 
of NIPT, implying that the government encourages screening,38 
making pregnant women more likely to participate without 
deliberation.
Putting up a (small) barrier by charging women, on the other 
hand, so it is argued, may help reinstall well-considered deci-
sion-making.39 If women must pay €175, the fee required in 
the Netherlands, or the small sum of €8.68, the fee required in 
Belgium, for NIPT, they will deliberate the benefits, risks and 
implications of screening. Especially in countries like the Neth-
erlands, where all ‘medically necessary’ healthcare services are 
offered free of charge, including the 20-week ultrasound scan, 
the copayment requirement may signal to women that NIPT is 
a different test, and help them understand that NIPT ‘is an offer 
that can be declined’.44 At the same time, however, it may signal 
that first-trimester screening is less relevant and lead women to 
(mistakenly) believe that screening is ‘not necessary’23 because of 
an assumed low risk of fetal abnormalities.
Thus, reimbursement policies are not neutral and may influ-
ence women’s choice behaviours. But is charging a substantial or 
a ‘symbolic’ sum an effective way to promote informed choices? 
Does it not have adverse moral implications? Are there no 
subsidiary and better ways to prompt women to make informed 
choices?
Although many women are willing to copay for NIPT,45 for 
some women, the costs of first-trimester screening withhold 
them from taking part.23 46 Personally incurred costs significantly 
influence pregnant women’s choices whether or not to undergo 
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screening.47 48 For a majority of Canadian women (66.4%), costs 
have ‘a lot of impact’ (5 on the 1–5 scale) on their decision to 
use screening.11 When a prenatal screening offer is declined on 
the basis of financial constraints, in fact quite the opposite from 
the ideal of informed choice is being realised: women are not 
choosing for or against NIPT based on their values, but because 
of financial constraints.
To illustrate the caveat, imagine that an opposite policy 
would be proposed: women who do not take part in prenatal 
screening are asked to pay a fee of €175. Policy makers would 
claim that this fee was introduced to prompt women to more 
thoroughly consider their decision. The fee, however, will 
likely be perceived by pregnant women as a discouragement 
or a punishment for the decision not to take part. This policy 
would signal that participation in screening is the preferred 
option and may limit women’s freedom to decline screening, 
thus failing to promote informed choice. Strictly speaking, if a 
fee is considered instrumental in promoting informed choice, 
it should apply to both options (screening and not screening). 
For if reproductive autonomy is the justified aim of prenatal 
screening programme, both options should be considered 
equally valuable and equally acceptable. A fee should be asked 
for both options or none.
In sum, it is unclear how funding policies best serve repro-
ductive autonomy. We have seen that there is no reason to 
assume that either a financial barrier or a fully reimbursed test 
will promote informed choice. To help women make choices 
regarding screening that are well informed, voluntary and 
consistent with their values, other solutions must be sought.
To make informed choices, women need time to become 
informed about screening, to talk to healthcare professionals 
and others, to imagine futures with children with disabilities, 
and to deliberate their options. Repeat discussions with health-
care professionals, over time, may be preferable to ‘only one 
point of contact’.3 Another requirement may be good informa-
tion about the implications of screening, offered individually 
and/or collectively, and through multiple modalities, including 
written information material and audiovisual material, and—if 
requested—balanced narratives from parents of children with 
disabilities to illustrate the range of experiences of living with 
and caring for children with disabilities.49 Further, women may 
need to be assisted in explicating their values and in making 
decisions in accordance with these values. In the Netherlands, 
obstetricians and midwives are specifically trained to focus on 
deliberation in pretest counselling. Counsellors are expected to 
conduct 30 min dedicated face-to-face discussions with pregnant 
women to facilitate informed choice for or against the NIPT 
offer.50
To help increase choice awareness regarding first-trimester 
prenatal screening, pretest counselling may therefore need to 
focus on conveying key information about the aim and utility 
of prenatal screening, and foremost on the question whether 
women and their partners wish to start on the trajectory of 
reproductive decision-making (at all). The decision (not) to 
take part in screening should be based on women’s values, not 
on their financial resources—although pregnant couples may 
reasonably ask themselves whether they have the social, prac-
tical and financial means to care for a child with a disability. 
Health professionals should discuss with pregnant women and 
their partners the reasons why they would wish to use screening, 
and what they would do in case of abnormalities.50 Not making 
people pay, but offering adequate pretest counselling should 
thus be (part of) a solution to safeguard informed choice. The 
offering of value-based pretest counselling will likely be more 
effective in promoting reproductive autonomy than the asking 
of a copayment for NIPT.
COnClusIOn
We have argued that the (co)payment requirement for NIPT is 
not a necessary nor a subsidiary approach to the promotion of 
informed choice among pregnant women and their partners, and 
does not serve reproductive autonomy. While informed choice 
remains of paramount importance in all prenatal screening 
programmes, there are no indications that charging women for 
NIPT will prove effective in accomplishing this. In fact, it may 
lead to the opposite of reproductive autonomy, when women 
forgo screening not based on well-considered choice, but simply 
because of financial constraints. Although reimbursement poli-
cies will likely affect pregnant women’s and their partners’ 
choice behaviour, neither full reimbursement nor the asking of 
a copayment is fully neutral, and neither will in and of itself 
improve informed choice. Rather, informed choice should be 
accomplished through adequate information provision and 
value-based pretest counselling focused on the promotion of 
choice awareness and deliberation.
Funding policies should not be used to prevent increased 
uptake of first-trimester prenatal screening. Financial barriers 
will disproportionately affect those of lower socioeconomic 
status, which is not in line with general justice requirements nor 
with the aim of prenatal screening. Instead, full reimbursement 
of NIPT for trisomies 13, 18 and 21—and in future, possibly for 
other serious childhood disorders—will help to guarantee equal 
access to prenatal screening and reproductive options.
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